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Abstract
This paper explores the role that model uncertainty plays in determining the eﬀect of mon-
etary policy shocks on unemployment dynamics in the euro area and the US. We specify a range
of BVARs that diﬀer in terms of variables, lag structure, and the way the inﬂation process is
modelled. For each model the central bank sets the interest rate minimizing a loss function.
Given this solution, we quantify the impact of a monetary policy shock on unemployment for
each model, and measure the degree of uncertainty as represented by the dispersion of both
t h ep o l i c yr u l ep a r a m e t e r sa n dt h ei m p u l s er e s p onse functions between models. The compar-
ative evidence from the US and the euro area data indicates that model uncertainty is indeed
an important feature, and that a model combination strategy might be a valuable advise to
policymakers.
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11 Introduction
This paper explores the role that the imperfect knowledge of the structure of the economy plays in
the uncertainty surrounding the e⁄ects of rule-based monetary policy on unemployment dynamics
in the euro area and the US.
An extended (empirical and theoretical) literature focuses on the relationship between monetary
policy and labour market dynamics (e.g. Brash 1995; and Blanchard 2003). Explanations of why
monetary policy shocks seem to have heterogeneous e⁄ects on the unemployment performance of
di⁄erent countries have mainly focused on the presence of (i) nominal rigidities (e.g. Jonsson 1997;
and Lockwood et al. 1998), (ii) wrong estimates of the NAIRU (e.g. Staiger et al. 1997; and
Estrella and Mishkin 1999); and (iii) changes in labour market institutions or on the interactions
between shocks and institutions (e.g. Nickell 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers 2000).
The heterogeneous results of these studies, as well as of the various economic and econometric
models employed, suggests that the size and the timing of the e⁄ect that a monetary policy action
might have on labour market variables in general and on unemployment in particular is highly
uncertain.
Since Brainard￿ s (1967) seminal paper, a great deal of literature has described how central banks
should take uncertainty into account in their decision-making process. Three types of uncertainty
are usually identi￿ed: data, parameter, and model uncertainty. Authors usually take into account
only one source of uncertainty at a time. Orphanides (2001) and Aoki (2003), for instance, focus on
whether data uncertainty, re￿ ected in a substantial di⁄erence between real-time and ￿nal estimates
of in￿ ation and the output gap, might produce misleading policy recommendations. Others, such
as Sack (1999), S￿derstr￿m (2002), Orphanides and Williams (2005), and Wieland (2000) analyse
the e⁄ect that parameter uncertainty might have on the formulation of monetary policy. Finally,
Levin et al. (2003), Onatski and Williams (2003), Brock et al. (2004), and Svensson and Williams
(2007) concentrate on model uncertainty.
Although with notable di⁄erences, overall these studies lead to the conclusion that the e⁄ects
of a given policy measure on the real activity or on unemployment might largely depend on the
three sources of uncertainty a central bank must cope with when formulating its policy. Most
of this literature, however, focuses only on how should monetary policy systematically react to
changes in unemployment and in￿ ation, and not so much on the e⁄ects that the choice of the rule
under uncertainty eventually brings about in terms of, say, responses of (and uncertainty around)
unemployment to the policy shock.
For instance, a common result when analysing the optimal behaviour that a central bank should
2follow in response to developments in the economy consists of a considerable di⁄erence between
the reaction coe¢ cients implied by the optimal policy rules and those implied by the historical
evidence. Precisely, the historical behaviour of central banks is usually less aggressive than the
one implied by optimal rules. Some authors, such as Rudebusch (2001), and Tetlow and von zur
Muehlen (2001), relate this attenuated monetary policy to the uncertainty the policymakers face
when setting interest rates.
Our paper aims at bridging the gap between the literature on the e⁄ects of monetary policy
shocks on unemployment on one side, and the literature on the choice of the policy rule under
uncertainty on the other. Concretely, we analyse the e⁄ect of a policy action on unemployment by
(i) estimating the policy rules, (ii) measuring the impact that a monetary policy based on these
rules has on unemployment, and (iii) quantifying the uncertainty surrounding both (i) and (ii). The
joined study of the systematic portion (i.e. the reaction function) and the stochastic component (i.e.
the monetary shock) of policy behaviour exhaustively explains the causes of the policy-instrument
variability.
We also aspire at providing some reference values for the reaction coe¢ cients in a policy rule
and for the responses of unemployment to a monetary policy shock. Our results can therefore be
taken as a benchmark for future references, for we explicitly deal with model, parameter and (to
some extent) data uncertainty. Our strategy is easily illustrated. We assume that the monetary
authority determines the interest rate which minimizes expected losses of a social objective function
that depends on the deviations between in￿ ation and unemployment from their target values, and
possibly on other contemporaneous and lagged variables, including lags of the policy variables. The
economy is alternatively summarised by a range of multivariate models that di⁄er in the way the
in￿ ation process is modelled, in terms of the variables entering in the model, and in the lag structure.
The structure of the economy is therefore uncertain in the double sense that parameter uncertainty
arises from the imprecise estimation of the dynamics of the economy and model uncertainty is
de￿ned relative to a certain baseline model as introduced and largely discussed, for instance, by
Brock et al (2007), or Onatski and Williams (2003).
The approach we take is Bayesian, and a complete model involving unobservables (e.g. paramet-
ers), observables (e.g. data), and variables of interest (e.g. policy rule, impulse response functions)
is identi￿ed by a joint distribution of these elements. Concretely, if M denotes a model, ￿M denotes
unobservables parameters, D denotes the observables, and ! is a vector of interest, then the model
M speci￿es the joint distribution
p(￿M;D;! j M) = p(￿M j M)p(D j ￿M;M)p(! j D;￿M;M) (1)
3The objective of inference, then, is expressed as the posterior density of !:
p(! j D;M) =
Z
p(! j D;￿M;M)p(￿M j D;M)d￿M (2)
which is the relevant density for the decisionmakers. In this framework, model uncertainty is
accounted for with the incorporation of several competing models M1;M2;:::;MJ; parameter un-





uncertainty might be relevant, for the data we rely on are subject to measurement error and can
be subject to considerable revision.
The objective is to evaluate the degree of dispersion of p(! j D;Mj) between models. The use
of di⁄erent data vintages ￿as represented, for instance, by the latest available series as opposed
to the preliminary or real time estimates ￿can then provide an illustration of the need to take
seriously the issue of data revision.
As said, the policymaker minimizes a loss function - subject to the economy as represented by
one of the models - and sets up a policy rule (reaction function) which we choose to be of two
types: (i) a linear optimal feedback rule (OFR), where the nominal interest rate depends on all
observable variables included in the model, and which appear to have a closed-form solution; and
(ii) an optimized Taylor rule (TR), where the interest rate is only a function of the current value
of the unemployment gap and the in￿ ation rate, similar to the original work of Taylor (1993), and
the weights attached to both variables are obtained with a grid search procedure.
In light of uncertainty about the correct model of in￿ ation, we then report the probability
distribution of the response of the unemployment rate to a monetary policy shock, and provide
various measures of dispersion to quantify the uncertainty surrounding the e⁄ects of policy across
the model space. In particular, we are interested in checking (i) how the responses vary across
models, (ii) how sensitive are the policy rules to model selection; and (iii) how much dispersion
in loss occurs when di⁄erent models are considered to evaluate the responses. The paper can be
considered as an extended application of the methodological approach suggested, for instance, by
Brock et al (2007). Like in their work all models are equally likely a priori; unlike their assumption
we specify informative priors and compare models on the basis of their marginal likelihoods.
Using data for the US and the euro area, we show that simple linear autoregressive models that
di⁄er in several dimensions may give rise to a signi￿cant degree of uncertainty in the distribution
of optimal policy parameters, expected losses and impulse responses. Simple or weighted averages
across models help dampen this uncertainty and provide a more consistent representation of the
policy rules and of the e⁄ects that policy actions based on such rules have on unemployment than
the one given by the ￿ best￿model. Although by choosing the best model the policy maker can
4not be seriously misled about the policy parameters, (s)he might nonetheless incur in a higher
associated cost. Results would also recommend choosing a relatively parsimonious representation
of the economy, regardless of the country and the policy rules. Finally, even though both the US
and the euro area data have a clear preference for a reduced set of models, the di⁄erences between
the best and the average models may be remarkable. For instance, averaging across models seem to
provide impulse responses which are more in line with sound theoretical arguments as, for instance,
in the case of the well known ￿price puzzle￿ .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the general framework
with the model space and the solution to the central bank￿ s problem. Section 3 reports the empirical
￿ndings in terms of expected loss, policy parameters, and e⁄ects of a monetary policy shock on
the unemployment gap in the designed uncertainty environment. Section 4 summarizes the paper￿ s
main ￿ndings and concludes.
2 Model uncertainty and optimal monetary policy: the macroe-
conometric framework
In this section we illustrate the empirical framework to answer our questions of interest. The
standard elements of the analysis comprise: (i) a set of monetary policy rules; (ii) a monetary
policymaker who choose the parameters of the rules minimizing a loss function; (iii) a set of models
which summarise the constraints faced by the policymaker in his minimization problem.
The context is quite standard and can be summarised along the following lines.
The set of models account for the uncertainty surrounding the representation of the economy.
As described in Brock et al. (2007) model uncertainty can be stemming from sources as di⁄erent
as economic theory, speci￿cation conditional on theory, and heterogeneity regarding the data gen-
erating process, among others. In our framework we will generate the model space by limiting the
analysis to multivariate dynamic linear models (VARs) which entail policy and non-policy variables,
with di⁄erent prior assumptions on both sets of variables, as well as on the lag structure.
The structural behavior of the non-policy variables is assumed to be given by the estimates of
the model. Using this estimated structure, the solution to the minimization problem yields the
values of the loss function under alternative policy parameters. A given set of these parameters
will then minimize the expected loss for each model. The interest rate policy that results from
this optimization problem can be a function of all current and lagged variables in the economy
(Optimal Feedback Rule), or simply a function of in￿ ation and unemployment gap similarly to the
original work by Taylor (1993) (Optimized Taylor Rule), in a way that takes into consideration the
dynamic behavior of these variables.
5Finally the optimal or optimized rules become part of the interest rate equation in a structural
VAR, and its disturbance is used to quantify the uncertainty surrounding the e⁄ect of a monetary
policy shock on the unemployment gap using a standard Impulse Response Function (IRF) analysis
as, e.g., in Stock and Watson (2001).
Next, we detail these elements backwards, starting from the model and then turning to the
policymakers and the rules.
2.1 The model space
We start by specifying a range of multivariate linear dynamic models which span the model space.


















where Zt is a vector of non-policy variables; it is the policy variable; A;b;c;d are comformable
matrices and vectors; "Z
t and "i
t are vectors of serially uncorrelated structural disturbances.1
The characteristics of the model space are easily described.
The non-policy block Zt contains at least the in￿ ation rate (￿t) and the (negative) unemploy-
ment gap (~ ut), calculated as the di⁄erence between the natural rate of unemployment (u￿
t) and its
actual value (ut).
Three sets of prior beliefs shape the dimensions of model uncertainty that characterize the
model space. The ￿rst one has to do with the way in￿ ation is modelled. Concretely, four general
prior assumptions are made according to whether in￿ ation is left unrestricted (UN), or whether
it is treated in the system as a random walk (RW), an AR(p) process, or a white noise (WN). In
all cases we take a Bayesian perspective and place the needed exclusion restrictions through the
allocation of probability distributions to the model￿ s coe¢ cients. The starting point is always a
Minnesota-type of prior: in the ￿rst case (UN) we complement the autoregressive representation
with the speci￿cation of a vague prior distribution and a loose tightness on all coe¢ cients; in the
other three setups, instead, we assume that in￿ ation follows one of the three processes by setting
accordingly the mean of own-lag coe¢ cients, and allow for a much tighter precision placed on all
coe¢ cients of the in￿ ation equation as compared to the precision placed on the coe¢ cients of other
equations. In other words, priors are always informative and di⁄er in the relative tightness placed
on the coe¢ cients in the equation for ￿t.
1The set up is similar the one used e.g. by Sack (2000) in a related context.
6While the RW and the AR hypotheses are relatively standard in the VAR literature (see e.g.
Doan et al. 1984; Stock and Watson 2007), the WN assumption has been recently validated in
studies on in￿ ation persistence that cover especially the last 10-15 years of sample observations.
Benati (2008), for instance, shows that on recent samples the WN assumption might have become
a reasonable one in several countries, including UK and the euro area, the latter especially after
the creation of EMU.
In the second set of priors, we enlarge the model space by changing the model speci￿cation in
the non-policy block, and considering all combinations of three additional endogenous variables:
the labour force participation rate (prt); the exchange rate (et); and a commodity price in￿ ation
rate (cpt).
The inclusion of the participation rate is motivated by the possibility of embracing a more
comprehensive dynamics of the labour market, as a negative impact on output of an increase in
the nominal interest rate may have diverse e⁄ects on the non-working labour force and ultimately
on the unemployment rate.2 The inclusion of the participation rate would account for these a⁄ects
and provide a cleaner picture of the transmission mechanism.
While the inclusion of an exchange rate might not be suitable for the US to have a desirable
equilibrium outcome (e.g. Taylor 2001), it might nonetheless be appropriate for the Euro area (e.g.
Peersman and Smets 2003; Altavilla 2003). In any case, its inclusion is intended to re￿ ect the
external environment, as well as its conditionality role for monetary policy, as it is an important
part of the monetary transmission mechanism in an open economy. The monetary policy rule used
here, therefore, will react to the exchange rate dynamics as this may help stabilize the economy,
for if the central bank responds to exchange rate ￿ uctuations, it might enforce faster convergence
of macro variables in response to shocks (see also Svennsson 2000, on this point).
Finally, we include a commodity price in￿ ation rate which should control for the expected future
in￿ ation, as it has become customarily in recent applied works on the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy shocks (see e.g Sack 2000.).
In the last set of prior assumptions di⁄erent lag structures model alternative ways of captur-
ing the dynamics of the system. The Wold theorem implies that VAR residuals must be white
noise. Sometimes this feature happens to be veri￿ed with a parsimonious representation of the lag
structure, perhaps with a rich number of endogenous variables. The VAR however easily becomes
overparametrised, as the number of coe¢ cients grows as a quadratic function of the number of vari-
2In fact, after a recessive shock, non-employed labour force of a given area can (i) remain unemployed, (ii) migrate
to another area, or (iii) stop looking for a job and become ￿discouraged workers￿ . For detailed analysis of these
hypothesis and of the concept of discouraged workers see e.g. Long (1953), Benati (2001); Darby et al. (2001);
Blundell et al. (1998); Clark and Summers (1982).
7ables and proportionately to the number of lags. To trade-o⁄ between parsimonious and realistic
assumptions, we combine dogmatic with ￿ exible priors and consider models where we progressively
￿x the lag length p, so that we have models with one, two, three, or four lags. Then, for models
where p > 1, a tight Minnesota prior on coe¢ cients di⁄erent from the own lag is used.
Summing up, then, the models space is composed of 128 = 4 ￿ 23 ￿ 4 models, i.e. 4 models
based on the assumptions on the in￿ ation dynamics; 23 combinations of models with a ￿xed block
[~ u;￿;i] and three additional non-policy variables; and 4 lag assumptions, from p = 1 to p = 4 for
each model. Each model is seen as a particular representation of the economy that the central bank
may assume when solving its dynamic control problem to appropriately set the interest rate.
2.2 The Central Bank￿ s Problem
The central bank minimizes an intertemporal loss function that has a positive relationship with the













where Et denotes the expectations conditional upon the available information set at time t, while
￿ is a given discount factor, with 0 < ￿ < 1. Moreover #, ￿, and ￿ are non-negative weights the
central bank attaches to in￿ ation stabilization, unemployment gap and interest rate smoothing,
respectively.
We assume an in￿ ation target of zero percent. As a benchmark for our analysis, we also assume
# = 4, ￿ = 1, and ￿ = 0:5. Based on an Okun￿ s gap type of relationship, the variance of the
unemployment gap is about 1/4 of the variance of the output gap, so this choice of # corresponds
to equal weights on in￿ ation and output gap variability.3
As shown in Rudebush and Svensson (1999), for ￿ = 1, we can rewrite the optimization problem
interpreting the intertemporal loss function as the unconditional mean of the period loss function.
Speci￿cally, the loss function can be written as the weighted sum of the unconditional variances of
the goal variables:
E [Lt] = #V ar[~ ut] + ￿V ar[￿t] + ￿V ar[it ￿ it￿1] (5)
The aim is to minimize this loss subject to
Xt+1 = ￿Xt + ￿it + ￿t+1 (6)
3We also checked how sensitive are results to alternative settings. In particular we were able to con￿rm the
previous ￿ndings of the literature that the posterior distribution of the policy reaction to both unemployment and
interest rate shifts monotonically with the values of these parameters in a reasonable range. These changes in the
policy rules, however, do not seem to have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the shape or the magnitude of the impulse response
functions.
8which is the State space representation of the VAR (3). The dynamic of the state is governed by the
matrix ￿ and the vector ￿ whose values are given by the point estimates of the corresponding VAR
coe¢ cients, and depend on the particular model considered in the estimation. As a consequences,
we have 128 state-space representations for each country. For example, in a model with 4 non-policy
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The loss function can therefore be expressed as:
















and ￿yy is the unconditional variance matrix of the goal variables.
2.3 The policy rules
Following Rudebush and Svennsson (1999), we consider a general feedback instrument rule which
has the following linear form:
i = fXt (7)
9where f is a conformable row vector.
The problem of minimizing in each period the loss function in (4) subject to (6) is standard,4
and results in an optimal linear feedback rule which, under the limit assumption of ￿ = 1, converges












The optimal value of (5) is given by
E (Lt) = trace(￿￿￿￿): (9)
This rule is less restrictive than a classical Taylor rule, as in this case the interest rate is
a function of all current and lagged values of the non-policy variables and lagged values of the
interest rate.
We also compare results to those obtained under an optimized classical Taylor rule that allows
the interest rate to react only to unemployment gap and in￿ ation, that is:





f = [f~ u (￿;￿) f￿ (￿;￿)] (10)
where we have made explicit that the parameters of the rule depend on the VAR coe¢ cients in an
open form, and need to be recovered with an optimization routine.6 Note that if we set to 3 the
coe¢ cient in the Okun￿ s law, the values of the coe¢ cients corresponding to the ones suggested by
Taylor (1993) would be f~ u = f￿ = 1:5 with r￿
t = ￿￿
t = 2.7
In our empirical exercise we also allow for the presence of a lagged interest rate, as most previous
estimates of the same rule ￿nd that the latter has a signi￿cant e⁄ect, possibly capturing an interest
rate smoothing (e.g. Clarida et al. 2000), or other relevant but omitted macroeconomic variables
(e.g. Sack 2000).
4See Rudebush and Svensson (1999) for the derivation of the unconditional variance of the goal variables.




0￿M and M = ￿ + ￿f; C =
CX + Cif, Q = C
0
XKCX; U = C
0
XKCi; R = C
0
iKCi:
6The policy rules considered in the analysis are alternative speci￿cations of the classic rule proposed by Taylor
(1993). When considering the unemployment gap (instead of the output gap), the Taylor rule (TR) has the following








t ￿ ut), where the interest rate ( it) depends on the ￿natural￿interest
rate ( r
￿
t), the deviation of actual in￿ ation ( ￿t) from a constant given in￿ ation target ( ￿
￿
t) and the di⁄erence between
the natural rate of unemployment ( u
￿
t) and its actual value ( ut).
7Stock and Watson (2001) use a coe¢ cient of 2.5 in the Okun￿ s law, implying fu = 1:25; Orphanides and Williams
(2005) use a coe¢ cient of 2 in the Okun￿ s law, which implies fu = 1. This range of values is approximately taken as
a benchmark in our empirical examination.
103 From the models to the data
In this section, we apply the framework illustrated above to US and euro area data, describe
carefully the estimation technique and present the results in terms of properties of the model and
impulse response dispersion.
3.1 Data and transformations
The data are quarterly values of in￿ ation, interest rate, unemployment rate, exchange rate, labour
force participation rate, and a commodity price index for the euro area and the US, covering 1970:1
to 2006:4. Sources are Datstream and the Area Wide Model (AWM) database (Fagan et al., 2005).
The in￿ ation rate is calculated as the four-quarter percentage change of CPI. The US interest
rate is the Federal Funds rate; the euro area interest rate is the short-run rate of the AWM database.
The unemployment gap is calculated as the di⁄erence between the natural rate of unemployment
(u￿
t) and its actual value (ut). The former in turn is computed with Baxter and King (1999)
detrending approach. Exchange rates and commodity price are used in standardized four-quarter
growth rates. All series are demeaned.
3.2 Estimation algorithm
The reduced form of (3) is estimated using Bayesian techniques and informative priors. Concretely,
if ￿ denotes the vector of all VAR coe¢ cients and ￿ denotes the variance-covariance matrix of









, the Bayesian algorithm implies




. In turn, given the estimated dynamic behavior of the
non-policy variables as summarised by the latter posterior distribution, we solve the minimization
problem and recover the distribution of the parameters of the rule that minimize the loss function.8
If we denote with !1 the vector of such parameters, its posterior distribution p(!1 j D;Mj) is
derived from







where f is given by (8) or (10).9 Finally, given the posterior mean of !1, we compute the distribution
of the unemployment response to a monetary policy shocks. The algorithm is applied for each model
Mj, country and policy rule.
8Following Sack (2000), the reaction function estimated from the VAR is ignored when solving the central bank￿ s
minimization problem.
9Note that the policy rule is assumed to be deterministic. Therefore its posterior uncertainty fully derives from
the uncertainty of the VAR coe¢ cients.






















denotes a Normal distribution with mean ￿ and variance-covariance matrix V￿.
The general form of p(￿) in all models is the one of a Minnesota-type of assumption, where the
prior mean of coe¢ cients for the ￿rst own lag is equal to one and the others are set equal to zero;
individual components of ￿ are independent of each other, i.e. V￿ is a diagonal matrix; and the




2 if i = j
(￿1￿2￿i=l￿j)
2 if i 6= j;
(12)
where vij;l is the prior variance of ￿ij;l (coe¢ cient in equation i relative to variable j at lag l), ￿1
is the general tightness, ￿2 is the tightness on ￿other coe¢ cients￿ , and l is the lag.
For all models we assume ￿1 = 0:1 and ￿2 = 1, and estimate the variances ￿i and ￿j from
AR(p) regressions on a training sample (1971:1-1990:4). In all restricted models for in￿ ation (AR,
RW and WN) the own-lag coe¢ cient of the prior mean ￿ is set accordingly, and the tightness is
set to 10￿3￿1. For the AR assumptions the own-lag coe¢ cients of the prior mean ￿ are estimated
on a training sample with univariate AR(p) regressions.
Regarding the prior for ￿, the prior scale matrix S is set equal to 10￿1I, and the degrees of
freedom ￿ equal n + 3, thus ensuring an informative but relatively vague prior assumption for ￿.
Given the independent structure of the prior, a closed form solution for the posterior distribution
of the parameters of interest is not available. It is easy to show, however, that a Gibbs sampler
can be employed because the full conditional distributions p(￿ j ￿;D) and p(￿ j ￿;D) are easily
derived (see Appendix). The sampler is initialised using the ML estimate of ￿ on a training sample.
For each draw of ￿ = (￿;￿), then, the parameters of the rule are derived from the minimization
problem. This algorithm provides the posterior distribution (11).
In the case of the optimised Taylor Rule, we use a grid search procedure to solve for the values
of f that minimize the criterion function (5). Because the computation with high-order models
becomes immediately cumbersome, we solve the optimisation problem by using the posterior mean
of ￿ and ￿, instead of grid-search for each draw of them.
In the case of the optimal feedback rule, instead, the computational burden is not so heavy, for
the optimal values of (8) and (9) are straightforward to compute. However, in order to ensure that
12the parameters of the rule have meaningful signs, we restrict the prior to be
q (￿) = p(￿) ￿ =(!1 2 F)
where =(!1 2 F) is the indicator function that equals 1 if !1 2 F and 0 otherwise, and F is the rel-
evant region. The corresponding posterior distribution is therefore q (￿ j D) = p(￿ j D)￿=(!1 2 F).
Strictly speaking, an importance sampling algorithm should be used instead of the Gibbs sampling,
and an importance function elicited. It is easy to show, however, that if the importance function
is the unrestricted posterior distribution we can still rely on the Gibbs sampling, drawing from the
unrestricted posterior and discarding draws which violate the restrictions.10
Finally, an equal prior probability p(Mj) = 1=J is assigned to each model, therefore the pos-
terior probability of the models is proportional to their marginal likelihood, i.e.
p(Mj j D) =
p(Mj)p(D j Mj)
P




j p(D j Mj)
(13)










d￿Mj is the marginal likelihood of model Mj.
An analytical evaluation of this integral is not possible given our prior assumptions, therefore we
simulate it from the Gibbs output using the harmonic mean of the likelihood values at each draw
of ￿ (Newton and Raftery, 1994).11
Results (discussed in the next subsections) are based on 10000 iterations of the Gibbs sampling,
after discarding an initial 5000 burn-in replications and using the remaining 5000 for inference.
3.3 Properties of model space and rules
We describe here some properties of the model space focusing on the Marginal Likelihood, the
parameters of the rules, and the expected losses.
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the distribution of the Relative Marginal Likelihood
(RML) across all models, for both the US and the euro area (EA). The RML is de￿ned as in (13),
where j goes from 1 to 128. Given the prior assumption that the models are all equally likely,
the RML gives the posterior model probability which measures how likely the data believe a given
model to be the correct one.
10In particular we assign a zero weigth to negative values of the parameters attached to the negative unemployment
gap, the in￿ ation gap and the lagged interest rate.
11As it is well known (Kass and Raftery 1995), the harmonic mean converges almost surely to the correct value
but does not generally satisfy a Gaussian central limit theorem. The measure can therefore be unstable, but it has
proven to provide more reliable estimates than, for instance, Chib￿ s (1995) measure (see Osiewalski and Pipien, 2004;
Canova and Ciccarelli, 2008).
13The marginal likelihoods turned out to be substantially di⁄erent across models, as shown by
the di⁄erence between the higher and the lower part of the distribution, and by the fact that only
for 13 percent of the models for the US and 25 percent for the euro area the RML is greater than
the equal weight (EW).
Table 1 about here
The ￿nding can be better appreciated from Figure 1, where we plot the RML of each model.
Models are ordered according to the number of variables: the ￿rst 16 models are speci￿ed with three
variables; the next 48 models contain four variables, and so on. The exact place of each model is
described in appendix A (Table A1).
The data seem to support relatively parsimonious models, as the ￿gure shows that the best
models are clustered around speci￿cations with 3 and 4 variables. The same speci￿cation with 4
variables which includes the participation rate is the preferred one both for the US and for the
euro area data. Interestingly, the models which receive less support by the data always include the
depreciation rate, regardless of the other variables included and of the country.
Figure 1 about here
Table 2 reports the estimates of the loss and of the relevant long run parameters of the Optimal
Feedback Rule (OFR) and the Taylor Rule (TR) relative to the models with the highest and the
lowest marginal likelihood. Note that while there is not much di⁄erence in the losses across models
and rules, optimal policy parameter estimates might vary substantially. Interestingly, the OFR
estimates relative to the best model are not only consistent with the literature, but also broadly
in line with the original (1993) Taylor rule. Moreover, losses seem to be smaller for both countries
and rules in the models with the lowest RML. A regression analysis across models, however, does
not seem to con￿rm any clear pattern between the posterior probability of a given model ￿as
summarised by the marginal RML ￿and the optimal policy parameters or the associated expected
losses (see below).
Table 2 about here
14Standard decision theory arguments imply that it is not desirable to simply rely on results for the
best model, regardless of the selection criterion, as this practice ignores both model and parameter
uncertainty. The distributions of the optimal policy parameters and the associated expected losses
across models therefore are summarised in Figure 2 and 3.
In Figure 2 we report the posterior distributions of the relevant parameters and of the losses
relative to the OFR, for each model. The solid black line that goes through the areas is the posterior
median of each model. The shaded areas comprise the 99 percent of the posterior distribution
around it, as in a fan chart representation: there is an equal number of bands on either side of the
central band. The latter covers the interquartile range and is shaded with the deepest intensity.
The next deepest shade, on both sides of the central band, takes the distribution out to 80%; and
so on, until the 99% of the distribution is covered.
We represent the models on the x-axes organised according to some level of complexity. Models
are ordered ￿rst according to the prior for in￿ ation (the ￿rst 32 models correspond to the UN prior,
the subsequent to the RW, then to the AR, and the last 32 models to the WN), and then, inside
each prior, they are sorted in ascending lag length order.
Figure 2 about here
In Figure 3 we summarise instead the distribution of the optimal policy parameters and expected
losses by only taking the posterior median across models. In this way we can visually compare results
also across the two rules.12 The box plots report therefore the extreme values and the interquartile
ranges computed using the posterior medians across the 128 models in a given class (OFR or TR) of
the relevant policy parameters fu=(1 ￿ fi), f￿=(1 ￿ fi) and fi that yielded the minimum expected
loss. The empty circles in the box plot are the weighted averages of the results, where the weights
are given by the RML. The ￿lled square represents instead results associated with the best models.
Figure 3 about here
Four sets of considerations emerge from the analysis of these charts.
First, the ranges of results are on average consistent with previous literature, as the bulks of the
distributions are concentrated on values in line both with the theory and with previous empirical
12Recall that due to the complexity of the grid search in the TR, we simulate the posterior distribution of parameters
and losses only for the OFR, whereas for the TR we compute the estimates of f using the posterior mean of ￿ = (￿;￿).
15￿ndings. This is true for both classes of rules, which also deliver very similar results. The dispersion
across models seems to be only marginally larger for the TR than for the OFR in both countries.
A closer look shows that the rough interquartile range of the optimal long-run reaction of
unemployment is [1:3 ￿ 3:5] for the US and [0:3 ￿ 1:8] for the euro area; the long run reaction of
in￿ ation is in the range [1:2 ￿ 2:5] for the US and [1:5 ￿ 2:7] for the euro area; and the lagged
interest rate coe¢ cient is in the range [0:1 ￿ 0:7] for both countries. The weighted averages and the
results associated with the best models are very much similar to the median values. These ￿ndings
indicate that in both countries the policies have on average been marginally more aggressive than
the original Taylor rule, and that there seem to be a signi￿cant e⁄ect of the lagged interest rate,
which indicates that interest rate smoothing is a robust feature of the policy. Very similar results
have been found by Brock et al. (2007), Levin and Williams (2003), and Clarida et al (2000),
among others, for the US; and by Smets and Wouters (2005), and Gerlach and Schnabel (2000),
among others, for the euro area.
Not surprisingly, results are also fairly consistent with the somewhat expected idea that the long
run reaction of the euro area policy rate to in￿ ation is greater than the one to real activity. The
opposite seems to be true on average for the US policy, which gives slightly less weight to in￿ ation
than to the unemployment gap. The comparison across countries also shows that on average the
US policy is more reactive to the unemployment gap than the euro area policy, whereas the latter
is more reactive to the in￿ ation gap than the US policy.
Second, there is a higher posterior uncertainty around the US estimates of the policy parameters
than around the euro area ones, as the more disperse distribution around US values seems to
indicate in Figure 2. This might be the result of di⁄erent sampling variability across the two
data sets together with the use of the same model speci￿cations and similar informative priors.
Note, however, that this result does not seem to hold when we consider the uncertainty around the
expected losses, which is fairly similar in both countries.
Third, some clear clusters with respect to expected losses seem to emerge across models. Figure
3 shows that the expected losses associated with the US policy parameters are overall lower than
those associated with euro area parameters for both rules. The range of values is again compatible
with the existing literature that uses similar values for the weights in the loss function, and, if
anything, our estimates seem to be on the lower side (see e.g. Brock et al., 2007; and Rudebush
and Svennson, 1999 for a comparison). Another feature we have noticed if we ordered in Figure 2
the losses following an ascending level of complexity as determined ￿rst by the lag length, is that
speci￿cations with one lag display a less volatile expected loss and a lower median level (the latter
is particularly evident in the case of US). This would imply that the more complex is the model
16economy, the higher and more imprecise is the expected loss that the policy maker faces. The result
would then suggest as a strategy for the policy maker to choose parsimonious models, although
they do not necessarily correspond to the ones with the highest RML. As a matter of fact, a clear
connection between the posterior probability of the models and the associated expected losses is
faded, as a scatter plot of both measures would show (Figure 4), although the chart in Figure 3
shows that losses associated with the best models (the ￿lled square symbols in the box plots) are
always in the upper tail of the distributions.
If instead we look at the order the losses according to the prior assumption for in￿ ation, there
is an overwhelming evidence that, for the AR prior, losses are systematically higher regardless of
the country and of other rearrangements. Notably, under the AR prior the values of the losses are
on average much closer to those that have been found in similar estimations by previous studies,
as our AR prior resembles more closely their estimation assumptions.
Figure 4 and 5 about here
Finally, there is a clear negative relationship which relates the optimal policy parameters and
the model complexity as represented by the lag length, as in each block of 32 models the median
values are clearly decreasing. This pattern is persistently more evident for the euro area than for
the US, and also con￿rms previous results (see e.g. Brock et al. 2007). Moreover, if we scatter
plot the policy parameters against the posterior weights of the model (RML), we ￿nd a signi￿cant
negative relationship, which is particularly evident if we restrict the attention to the models with
the highest posterior probability and to the long run reaction of unemployment and in￿ ation rate
(Figure 5). This ￿nding might not be surprising, and somewhat con￿rm the prior idea that the
models preferred by the data are associated with policy parameters which are a priori regarded as
more likely by the profession.
In sum, all charts and tables discussed in this section con￿rm that simple linear autoregressive
models that di⁄er in several dimensions may give rise to a signi￿cant degree of uncertainty in the
distribution of optimal policy parameters and expected losses. Simple or weighted averages across
models help dampen this uncertainty and provide a more consistent representation of the policy
rules than the one based on ￿ best￿models selected using their posterior probability. Although by
choosing the best model the policy maker can not be seriously misled about the policy parameters,
(s)he might nonetheless incurr in a higher associated cost. Results ￿that are very much consistent
with previous literature ￿would also recommend choosing a relatively parsimonious representation
of the economy, regardless of the country and the policy rules.
173.4 Uncertain e⁄ects on unemployment: Impulse response dispersion
In this subsection we report the probability distribution of the unemployment gap response to a
monetary policy shock and measure its dispersion in light of the uncertainty about the correct
model discussed above.
Using the structural VAR in (3), we assume that the central bank sets the policy variables it
according to the two policy rules OFR and TR as estimated in the previous step. The estimated
equation error "i
t can be interpreted as a monetary policy shock, as also discussed e.g. by Stock
and Watson (2001), or Sack (2000). The shock is identi￿ed by (i) replacing the parameters of
the policy equation with the posterior means of the f estimated above, while leaving unrestricted
all the other parameters of the VAR; and (ii) imposing the timing assumption that the central
bank reacts contemporaneously to all variables in the economy, whereas the policy rate does not
contemporaneously a⁄ect the rest of the economy. The former restriction is placed in the form of
a normal distribution with a very tight variance. The latter restriction is a pure zero-restriction.
A relatively vague Minnesota prior is assumed on the rest of parameters in the two blocks.
How do the impulse responses of (negative) unemployment gap to a surprise 100 basis point
increase in the policy rate look like? Before examining the degree of dispersion across models, rules
and countries, and focus only on the reaction of unemployment, we plot in Figure 6 the impulse
responses of unemployment, in￿ ation and interest rate computed averaging over all models with
the optimal feedback rule and the Taylor rule, for both the US and the euro area. Dashed lines
represent the 68 percent con￿dence bands computed for the OFR.
Note that the responses have the expected signs across countries and rules, and, except for the
somewhat uncertain response of in￿ ation in the euro area, they are also signi￿cant. The impacts do
not seem statistically di⁄erent across rules in the two countries, as both rules are backward-looking.
There are however some di⁄erences across countries in the responses of both unemployment and
in￿ ation, in the lags and the magnitude. Average responses are somewhat more pronounced in the
euro area. Cumulatively after 36 quarters the e⁄ect on the unemployment gap is on average of 0.2
percentage point for the US and between 0.3 (TR) and 0.5 (OFR) for the euro area, whereas the
e⁄ect on in￿ ation is on average of 1.0 percentage point in the US, and between 1.2 (OFR) and 1.6
(TR) percentage points in the euro area. Note ￿nally that, as in previous studies (see e.g. Stock
and Watson, 2001 for the US and Peersmann and Smets, 2003) the lags of in￿ ation are quite long
and most of the decline occurs between the third and the fourth year after the monetary contraction
across both countries and rules.
Figure 6
18We turn now to focus on the reaction of the unemployment rate across models. In Figure 7 we
report these responses for both countries and rules. To jointly visualize the dispersion within and
between models we report the posterior distribution of the IRF obtained from the MCMC simulation
by ￿ fan-charting￿separately three quantiles of such distributions ￿the median responses, the 16th
percentile and the 84th percentile ￿for all models. Therefore, in the charts with the title ￿ median￿ ,
for instance, we plot the ￿ fan-chart￿distribution of the median responses across models. In each
chart, the shaded areas represent the dispersion across models. The principle is the same as in a
fan chart representation: There is an equal number of bands on either side of the central band.
The latter covers the interquartile range across models and is shaded with the deepest intensity.
The next deepest shade, on both sides of the central band, takes the distribution out to 80%; and
so on, until the 99% of the distribution is covered. The solid black line that goes through the areas
is the weighted average of each quantile (median, 16th and 84th percentile) across models, where
the weights are given by the RML of each model.
Several comments are in order.
First, the impulse responses look reasonably well behaved and their pattern fairly robust across
models, countries and rules. An important dimension of such robustness is that, although model
responses are dispersed, signi￿cance of the average results at the expected horizons appears to be a
robust feature. Given the timing assumption, the initial rate hike results in a null contemporaneous
e⁄ect on the economy. On average across models, rules and countries most of the signi￿cant
economic slowdown occurs in the ￿rst two years after the rate hike, when the cumulative impact
on the unemployment gap is between -0.2 and -0.4 percentage points, on average across models,
rules and countries. Some di⁄erences between countries have already been highlighted above.
Second, overall the results do not seem to be extremely sensitive to the policy rule used in the
identifying assumption of the structural VAR. The result does not come entirely as a surprise, for
both rules are backword-looking, although the OFR is less restrictive than TR being a function of
all current and lagged values of the non-policy variables and lagged values of the interest rate.
Third, there is a reasonable degree of uncertainty across models, for a given rule or country,
which is a direct consequence of the dispersion of policy parameters. Interestingly, results for the
euro area are in general much more dispersed than those for the US. This is particularly true at all
steps for the OFR and at the longer steps for the TR, as shown also in Figure 8 where we report
the standard deviation at each step of the impulse responses across models. This evidence suggests
that, even if the degree of dispersion in the distribution of policy parameters and expected losses
is broadly similar across country, the conclusion on the e⁄ects of a monetary policy shock can be
more uncertain possibly due to a di⁄erent sampling variability or a di⁄erent interactive dynamics
19of the variables in the two model economies. With the exception of the TR for the euro area, the
uncertainty is also bigger around the peak values of the responses, usually between one and two
years.
Figure 7 and Table 3 about here
Fourth, a complementary inference can be derived from Table 3, where we quantify the inform-
ation contained in Figure 7, and report the cumulative impacts between horizons. These numbers
can provide useful benchmark references for future studies that wish to quantify the e⁄ect of a mon-
etary policy shock in the US and the euro area, if such quanti￿cation is obtained with a structural
VAR model that uses similar variables over an analogous sample of data. One conclusion is that
the e⁄ect is certainly signi￿cant between 1 and 8 quarters in both countries. Another conclusion
is that quantitative results, which are relatively similar for di⁄erent rules in each country, di⁄er
across countries: the cumulative average impact in the euro area after two years is around 0.45,
whereas the same impact for the US is around 0.3.
Figure 8 about here
Finally, given the relatively high degree of uncertainty, it is recommendable that the policy
implications would not be derived conditionally on a single model but rather on a weighted average.
Note from the black line in the charts of Figure 6 and the numbers of Table 3 that the weighted
average across models always provides a lower response than the median model. This implies,
among other things, that the models which receive more support by the data ￿and therefore are
weighted more in the average ￿tend to dampen the response of unemployment to a monetary policy
shock relatively to the other models.
A question arises naturally then: Would the policy maker who chooses a single model come to
a very misleading conclusion about the e⁄ect of a monetary policy shock? Part of the answer can
be found in Figure 9, where we plot the average responses of the three main variables together with
the responses obtained from the best models. In both cases we focus on results obtained under our
preferred rule (OFR).
Figure 9 about here
20Di⁄erences do seem relevant in both countries. In particular, the response of the unemployment
gap in the best models are more pronounced for the two countries, both at the peak and cumulat-
ively. Even more interestingly, while the response of in￿ ation computed from the best model shows
a ￿price puzzle￿for both countries ￿more markedly signi￿cant for the US than for the euro area
economy ￿with consequent associated long lags, the average responses computed across all models
almost eliminate the initial upward swing and provide a more reasonable timing and magnitudes
of the in￿ ation responses.
Some important conclusions can therefore de drawn from the whole discussion. One conclusion
is that the average results for the US and the euro area are qualitatively similar, with the latter
being more dispersed than the former. Another conclusion is that dispersion across models is a
feature not only of the policy rules but also of the impulse response functions, and that policymakers
face considerable uncertainty about the future development of relevant variables and the impact
of a given measure. Averaging is therefore a good advise to the policymaker to dampen out this
dispersion. Finally, even though the data have a very strong preference for a small subset of models,
the di⁄erences between the best and the average models may be remarkable, with the results of the
latter being more in line with theoretical arguments as, for instance, in the case of the cutback of
the well known ￿price puzzle￿ . Overall, therefore, our results con￿rm that the model-combination
strategy that central banks already follow when assessing the risks to price stability or deciding a
given policy is indeed an appropriate strategy.
3.5 The real-time dilemma: Preliminary vs. latest available data
We conclude our empirical exploration with a simple additional exercise, and check how sensitive
might the previous results be to data uncertainty, by estimating the policy rules and running the
same impulse response analysis on preliminary instead of fully revised data.
The idea is that all relevant information for monetary policy is measured with error. As early
releases of data can be noisy, the di⁄erence between the response coe¢ cients obtained using real-
time vs. fully revised (or latest available) data might measure the uncertainty that policymakers
face when making decisions using policy rules.
The scope of this analysis is much more limited than the one conducted above. In particular: (i)
we focus only on US data, as the real-time data for the euro area have a much smaller coverage; (ii)
we consider only the simplest set of models with three variables, as none of the additional variables
included in the extended models is either revised or simply available in the existing real-time data
sets. Moreover, we use a di⁄erent de￿nition for in￿ ation and take the growth rate of the output
de￿ ator, which is a variable subject to revision, whereas the CPI used so far is typically not revised.
21In this way we have two (unemployment and in￿ ation) of the three variables of the VARs subject
to revision, instead of just one (unemployment).
The data used come from the real-time data set for macroeconomists, developed at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and described in great details for instance in Crushore and Stark
(2001).
Table 4. about here
Table 4 reports the average rule coe¢ cients for the three variables of interest and the two rules
across models. Consistently with the results of previous studies (see e.g. Aoki 2003; and Jarkko
and Yates 2005), the response coe¢ cients in both the optimal feedback rule and the Taylor rule are
higher when we run the estimation with the data available in real-time, which implies that both
policies might be more aggressive than what a revision of data would entail.
In line with the previous literature, therefore, our results also strengthen the case for a more
cautious monetary policy strategy. Speci￿cally, in order to reduce policy mistakes, central banks
should not react strongly to out-of-target developments in in￿ ation and unemployment gap and
should attenuate the response coe¢ cients in an optimal policy rule, for the measurement error
in early vintages of data signi￿cantly a⁄ects the real-time results with the consequence that a
￿ne-tuning monetary policy might amplify the business cycle.
How much sensitive could then be the response of unemployment to a monetary policy shock
given these di⁄erences in the policy rules due to the various data vintages? A simple way of
answering this question is to visually compare the di⁄erence between the impulse responses obtained
with the two sets of data. Figure 10, for instance, compares the weighted average across models
of the median, the 16th and 84th percentile responses (36 steps) obtained using the fully revised
data set (vertical axis) with the same percentiles based on real time data (horizontal axis). If the
response functions were una⁄ected by the data sets, we should expect all points to lay on the 45
degree line.
Figure 10 about here
The charts indeed show some notable divergence, as the points summarizing the impulse re-
sponse distribution tend to deviate from the diagonal for both the optimal feedback rule and the
Taylor rule. Data revisions therefore a⁄ect the probability distribution of the unemployment re-
sponse to a monetary shock, though the di⁄erences seem quantitative in line with the uncertainty
22and the ranges reported in the previous subsection, and not as much informative as one would
argue.
This simple experiment would therefore indicate that the analysis conducted in real-time to
evaluate the e⁄ects on unemployment of a monetary policy shock would not lead to a signi￿cantly
di⁄erent conclusion from an ex-post one based on fully revised data. This is in part due to the
limitation of the current comparison. As stressed in another paper (Altavilla and Ciccarelli 2007),
results based only on the comparison between preliminary vs. latest available data might not be
as informative as those that would instead be based on all available vintages or revisions. Our
recommendation in evaluating the use of real-time data in policy experiments ￿to check if and how
revisions systematically a⁄ect the results ￿would be for a much more comprehensive approach that
makes use of the whole revision process. Such an extension goes however well beyond the scope of
this paper.
4 Conclusions
This paper has shown that model uncertainty plays a crucial role in determining the e⁄ects of
monetary policy shocks on unemployment dynamics in the euro area and the US.
Following previous methodological works, for instance by Brock et al (2007), we have speci￿ed a
range of 128 BVAR models that di⁄er in terms of variables, lag structure, and the way the in￿ ation
process is modelled. Each model is a constraint for the central bank which sets the interest rate
minimizing a loss function. Given the solution in terms of policy rule, we quantify the impact of a
monetary policy shock on unemployment, and measure the degree of uncertainty as represented by
the dispersion of both the policy rule parameters and the impulse response functions across models.
The comparative evidence from the US and the euro con￿rm that simple linear autoregressive
models that di⁄er in several dimensions may give rise to a signi￿cant degree of uncertainty in the
distribution of optimal policy parameters, expected losses and impulse response functions. Simple
or weighted averages across models help dampen this uncertainty and provide a more consistent
representation of both the policy rules and the e⁄ects on unemployment than the one based on
￿ best￿models selected using their posterior probability. Moreover, even though the data seem to
have a very strong preference for a small subset of models, the di⁄erences between the best and the
average models may be remarkable. In particular averaging across models seem to provide impulse
responses which are more in line with theoretical arguments as, for instance, in the case of the
cutback of the well known ￿price puzzle￿ .
We have also shown that, even though by choosing the best model the policy maker can not be
seriously misled about the policy parameters, (s)he might nonetheless incur in a higher associated
23cost. Results ￿that are very much consistent with previous literature ￿would also recommend the
choice of relatively parsimonious representations of the economy, regardless of the country and the
policy rules. Overall our results ￿ which are very similar for US and the euro area ￿con￿rm that
the model-combination strategy that central banks already follow when assessing the risks to price
stability or deciding a given policy is indeed an appropriate strategy.
To some extent, and given the scope of the analysis, our quantitative results can also be used
as references for the quanti￿cation of policy rules and impulse responses in similar future studies.
Finally, a preliminary and incomplete evidence seems to indicate that data vintages and re-
visions might make a di⁄erence in the choice of the policy parameters as well as in the e⁄ects
on unemployment of a policy measure. A much deeper analysis which exploits information con-
tained in all vintages or historical revisions might be needed, perhaps in a uni￿ed framework that
simultaneously consider data, parameter and model uncertainty.
24Appendix
A Models
The following table (A1) describes the 128 models that form the model space. The ￿rst column
reports the model number. In the second column the models speci￿cation is detailed with the
number and the type of variables used; the third column reports the codi￿cation where V stands
for variable, L for lags and P for prior of in￿ ation.
Table A1 here
B Derivation of the posterior
By stacking appropriately variables and coe¢ cients in the VAR (3), we can re-write it as:
yt = (In ￿ Wt)￿ + "t (14)
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where, as in the text, D represents the stacked data.
Given the joint prior distribution on the parameters, p(￿;￿), the joint posterior distribution of
the parameters conditional on the data is obtained through the Bayes rule
p(￿;￿ j D) =
p(￿;￿)L(D j ￿;￿)
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25The joint posterior density for (￿;￿) is proportional to the product of (15), (16), and (17). Given
the independency assumption, such posterior does not take the form of a standard distribution
and cannot be directly used for inference. A Gibbs sampling algorithm is instead available, for the
conditional posterior of both ￿ and ￿ are simple to derive. The conditional posterior of ￿ is derived
by multiplying (15) and (16), and ignoring the terms that in the product do not involve ￿. It is
given by
p(￿ j D;￿) = N
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Similarly, the conditional posterior for ￿ is derived by multiplying (15) and (17). Ignoring the
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Starting from arbitrary values of ￿, a Gibbs algorithm samples alternately from (18) and (19).
The RATS codes used to perform estimation and inference are available from the authors upon
request.
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Figure 1. Relative Marginal Likelihoods
Note: The models on the x-axis are ordered by lags, priors on inflation, and number of variables. The first 16 models are those with 3 variables; the next 48 models 






























posterior weight equal weight32
Figure 2. Posterior distributions of policy parameters and expected losses
Note: The models on the x-axis are ordered by level of complexity as determined by the prior on
inflation and the number of lags. Therefore models with the UN prior are placed first ; models with the



























































Note: The box plots report minimum, maximum, and interquartile range for each rule and country. Empty circles represent the best models; full squares are the 
weighted averages





















































































Figure 4. Dispersion of expected losses























































Figure 5. Dispersion of policy parameters. OFR

















































































Figure 6. Impulse response functions. Weighted averages across models
Note: The charts plot the weighted average unemployment responses to a monetary policy shock identified with the optimal feedback rule (OFR) and the Taylor rule (TR). Dashed lines are the 68 percent confidence 

































































1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36
OFR TR37
Optimal Feedback Rule Taylor Rule
Note: the `fan-chart' distribution across models of the median, the 16th and the 84th percentile responses are reported in each chart. The shaded areas represent the dispersion across models. The principle is the same as in a fan chart 
representation: there is an equal number of bands on either side of the central band. The latter covers the interquartile range across models and is shaded with the deepest intensity. The next deepest shade, on both sides of the central 
band, takes the distribution out to 80%; and so on, untile the 99% of the distribution is covered. The solid black line that goes through the areas is the weigthed average of each quantile (median, 16th and 84th percentile) across models, 
where the weights are given by the RML of each model.
Figure 7. Impulse response dispersion across models
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Figure 8. Standard deviations across IRF
Note: The charts plot the standard deviation of three percentiles (black= 50%, red = 16%, blue = 84%) of the 








































Figure 9. Comparison between IRF of best and average model
Note: The charts plot the median unemployment responses relative to the best model and the weighted average model to a monetary policy shock identified with the optimal feedback rule (OFR). Dashed lines 
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average model best model40
Figure 10. Fully revised vs. real-time data: IRF
Note: Circles represent the (weigthed) average IRF. On the x-axis are the IRF computed using the real time data. On the y-axis are the IRF computed using the latest 
available data. 36 steps are reported. Diagonals are the 45 degree lines.
Median 84th Percentile 16th Percentile
Optimal Feedback Rule


























































































































































































































Fraction of models with RML>EW
Sum of RML for models with RML>EW
Sum of RML
Table 2. Properties of the models with lowest and highest RML
Variables Lags Prior Type f u/(1-f i)f π/(1−f i) f i Loss f u/(1-f i)f π/(1−f i) f i Loss
Highest RML
US u,pr,π,i 3 3 1.7 1.6 0.6 7 2.6 1.8 0 7.3
EA u,pr,π,i 4 3 0.8 1.4 0.4 8.5 0.8 1.7 0 9
Lowest RML
US u,pr,π,Cp,e,i 4 4 2.3 2.5 0.7 2.9 3.9 1.3 0.8 2.9















Note: This table reports the distribution across models of their Relative Marginal 
Likelihoods (RML), given in Eq. (13) and computed using the harmonic mean of the 
Gibbs output.
Note: The table reports the posterior mean values of the optimal policy parameters and the expected losses for the models with the 
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12 -0.32 -0.22 -0.22 -0.12 -0.20 -0.11 -0.11 -0.03 -0.11 -0.01 -0.02 0.10 -0.28 -0.16 -0.13 -0.05 -0.17 -0.10 -0.07 0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 0.13
16 -0.23 -0.13 -0.13 0.00 -0.12 -0.01 -0.03 0.13 -0.05 0.09 0.06 0.30 -0.14 -0.07 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.17
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24 -0.14 -0.03 -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.05 0.03 0.26 0.01 0.14 0.11 0.46 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.24
28 -0.11 -0.02 -0.05 0.10 -0.04 0.05 0.03 0.23 0.01 0.13 0.09 0.42 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.24
32 -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.35 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.23
36 -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.29 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.19
cumulative impact 
after 2 years -1.05 -0.75 -0.69 -0.49 -0.69 -0.44 -0.43 -0.21 -0.37 -0.15 -0.12 0.12 -0.99 -0.56 -0.46 -0.25 -0.71 -0.37 -0.31 -0.06 -0.49 -0.19 -0.13 0.26
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Note: The table reports for each quantile of the IRF (median, 16th and 84th) the distribution across models of the cumulative response of unemployment between forecast steps. For instance, at step 4 the cumulative impact 
between step 2 and step 4 is repor
median 84th
16th median 84th 16th median 84thReal-Time Fully-Revised Real-Time Fully-Revised Real-Time Fully-Revised
Optimal feedback rule
Average 3.23 2.50 2.18 1.78 0.58 0.56
St. Dev. 2.02 2.34 0.70 1.20 0.08 0.14
Taylor Rule
Average 2.13 1.08 1.38 0.75 0.25 0.48
St. Dev. 0.71 0.88 0.49 0.61 0.30 0.31
43
Table 4. Fully revised vs. real-time data: Long run policy parameters
Unemployment Inflation Interest rate
Note: values are the weighted averages across models, where weights are given by the RML of each model. Only models with three variables are 
considered.Model number
Specification 
and order of the 





Model 1 3 Variables 3V_1L_1P Model 65 5 Variables 5V_1L_1P
Model 2 u,p,i 3V_2L_1P Model 66 u,pr,p,Cp,i 5V_2L_1P
Model 3 3V_3L_1P Model 67 5V_3L_1P
Model 4 3V_4L_1P Model 68 5V_4L_1P
Model 5 3V_1L_2P Model 69 5V_1L_2P
Model 6 3V_2L_2P Model 70 5V_2L_2P
Model 7 3V_3L_2P Model 71 5V_3L_2P
Model 8 3V_4L_2P Model 72 5V_4L_2P
Model 9 3V_1L_3P Model 73 5V_1L_3P
Model 10 3V_2L_3P Model 74 5V_2L_3P
Model 11 3V_3L_3P Model 75 5V_3L_3P
Model 12 3V_4L_3P Model 76 5V_4L_3P
Model 13 3V_1L_4P Model 77 5V_1L_4P
Model 14 3V_2L_4P Model 78 5V_2L_4P
Model 15 3V_3L_4P Model 79 5V_3L_4P
Model 16 3V_4L_4P Model 80 5V_4L_4P
Model 17 4 Variables 4V_1L_1P Model 81 5 Variables 5V_1L_1P
Model 18 u,pr,p,i 4V_2L_1P Model 82 u,pr,p,e,i 5V_2L_1P
Model 19 4V_3L_1P Model 83 5V_3L_1P
Model 20 4V_4L_1P Model 84 5V_4L_1P
Model 21 4V_1L_2P Model 85 5V_1L_2P
Model 22 4V_2L_2P Model 86 5V_2L_2P
Model 23 4V_3L_2P Model 87 5V_3L_2P
Model 24 4V_4L_2P Model 88 5V_4L_2P
Model 25 4V_1L_3P Model 89 5V_1L_3P
Model 26 4V_2L_3P Model 90 5V_2L_3P
Model 27 4V_3L_3P Model 91 5V_3L_3P
Model 28 4V_4L_3P Model 92 5V_4L_3P
Model 29 4V_1L_4P Model 93 5V_1L_4P
Model 30 4V_2L_4P Model 94 5V_2L_4P
Model 31 4V_3L_4P Model 95 5V_3L_4P
Model 32 4V_4L_4P Model 96 5V_4L_4P
Model 33 4 Variables 4V_1L_1P Model 97 5 Variables 5V_1L_1P
Model 34 u,Cp,p,i 4V_2L_1P Model 98 u,Cp,p,e,i 5V_2L_1P
Model 35 4V_3L_1P Model 99 5V_3L_1P
Model 36 4V_4L_1P Model 100 5V_4L_1P
Model 37 4V_1L_2P Model 101 5V_1L_2P
Model 38 4V_2L_2P Model 102 5V_2L_2P
Model 39 4V_3L_2P Model 103 5V_3L_2P
Model 40 4V_4L_2P Model 104 5V_4L_2P
Model 41 4V_1L_3P Model 105 5V_1L_3P
Model 42 4V_2L_3P Model 106 5V_2L_3P
Model 43 4V_3L_3P Model 107 5V_3L_3P
Model 44 4V_4L_3P Model 108 5V_4L_3P
Model 45 4V_1L_4P Model 109 5V_1L_4P
Model 46 4V_2L_4P Model 110 5V_2L_4P
Model 47 4V_3L_4P Model 111 5V_3L_4P
Model 48 4V_4L_4P Model 112 5V_4L_4P
Model 49 4 Variables 4V_1L_1P Model 113 6 Variables 6V_1L_1P
Model 50 u,e,p,i 4V_2L_1P Model 114 u,pr,p,Cp,e, i 6V_2L_1P
Model 51 4V_3L_1P Model 115 6V_3L_1P
Model 52 4V_4L_1P Model 116 6V_4L_1P
Model 53 4V_1L_2P Model 117 6V_1L_2P
Model 54 4V_2L_2P Model 118 6V_2L_2P
Model 55 4V_3L_2P Model 119 6V_3L_2P
Model 56 4V_4L_2P Model 120 6V_4L_2P
Model 57 4V_1L_3P Model 121 6V_1L_3P
Model 58 4V_2L_3P Model 122 6V_2L_3P
Model 59 4V_3L_3P Model 123 6V_3L_3P
Model 60 4V_4L_3P Model 124 6V_4L_3P
Model 61 4V_1L_4P Model 125 6V_1L_4P
Model 62 4V_2L_4P Model 126 6V_2L_4P
Model 63 4V_3L_4P Model 127 6V_3L_4P
Model 64 4V_4L_4P Model 128 6V_4L_4P
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Table A1. Mapping of the model numbers with the specifications according to number of 
variables, lags, and priors on inflation